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DOCTRINE: IS BRUTON APPLICABLE
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PROHIBIT USE OF A CODEFENDANT'S
CONFESSION AS EVIDENCE AGAINST A
DEFENDANT ALTHOUGH THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE WOULD
ALLOW SUCH USE?
JAMES B. HADDAD* AND RICHARD G. AGIN**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bruton v. United States,1 principles of domestic evidence law,
namely the federal hearsay rule, prohibited the prosecution from using the confession of codefendant Evans as evidence against defendant Bruton.2 Evans did not take the stand and was unavailable for
cross-examination by Bruton's counsel. 3 The trial court admitted
the confession as evidence against Evans. 4 It instructed the jury to
disregard the confession in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. 5 Under these circumstances, the United States Supreme
Court found a violation of Bruton's sixth amendment right to "be
confronted with the witnesses" against him, reasoning that the limit*

Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

** Associate, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois. The authors gratefully acknowledge

the helpful criticisms of ProfessorJ. Alexander Tanford of Indiana University at Bloomington School of Law and of Ronald Jay Allen and Ian Ayres, both of Northwestern
University School of Law.
1 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Throughout this article, we use the word "defendant" to
designate the non-confessing accused person and the word "codefendant" to designate
the confessing accused person. We use the word "confession" to include inculpatory
admissions and statements which, unlike confessions in the strictest sense, do not necessarily admit to every element of an offense.
2 Id. at 126.
3 Id. at 127.
4 Id. at 124-25.
5 Id. at 125.
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ing instruction was likely to be ineffective. 6
8
7
After Bruton, however, in Dutton v. Evans and in Lee v. Illinois,
the Supreme Court suggested that each jurisdiction can shape its
own rules of evidence to admit some codefendant confessions as evidence against a defendant, under an exception to the hearsay rule,
and still not be deemed guilty of a Confrontation Clause violation,
even where the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the
confessing codefendant. 9 Approximately one-half of all American
jurisdictions, nevertheless, still do not recognize a hearsay exception which would allow the prosecution to use, under certain circumstances, a codefendant's confession as evidence against his or
her fellow defendant.' 0 In the legal vernacular, these jurisdictions
6 Id. at 137. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45 (concerning Bruton's essential
premise that, under domestic law, the confession of codefendant Evans was inadmissible
hearsay as to the defendant Bruton.)
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986), the Court agreed that a Bruton issue
arises only because of the unwillingness or inability ofjuries to adhere to limiting instructions, saying, "[T]his is not strictly speaking a Bruton case because we are not here concerned with the effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing spill-over prejudice
to a defendant when his codefendant's confession is admitted against the codefendant at
a joint trial." However, Bruton is not applicable to bench trials. See generally Haddad,

Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rationale, and a Proposalfora
Due ProcessEvaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1980) (arguing that Bruton is inapplicable to bench trials); cf. Garcia, The Winding Path of Bruton v.
United States: A Case of Doctrinal Inconsistency, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 402 n.8 (1988)

(suggesting that issue is open). See also People v. Moore, 128 Ill. App. 3d 505, 514, 470
N.E.2d 1284, 1290-91 (1984) (when trier of fact is trialjudge, denial of motion for severance does not deprive defendant of fair trial). But see People v. Schmitt, 173 Ill. App. 3d
66, 92-93, 527 N.E.2d 384, 400 (1988) (Bruton applied to joint nonjury trial), rev'd, 131
Ill. 2d 128, 545 N.E.2d 665 (1989).
Nor does Bruton apply where the confessing defendant testifies and is available for
cross-examination by the codefendant. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971). See also
infra text accompanying notes 126-134.
Finally, the codefendant's statement must have implicated the defendant for Bruton
to apply. See generally Haddad, supra at 20-25 (noting the decided cases and criticizing
some applications of this limitation). See also infra note 12.
7 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
8 476 U.S. 530 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 71-82.
9 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80-83; Lee, 476 U.S. at 543. Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Dutton, suggested that states could engage in a "wholesale avoidance" of Bruton by allowing a codefendant's admissions to be used as evidence against a defendant. 400 U.S.
at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EviDENCE § 804(b)(3)(03), at 804-151-52 (1975).
10 Before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the overwhelming majority of
American jurisdictions followed the English rule prohibiting the use of declarations
against penal interest. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 278 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing the Sussex Peerage case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844), which rejected the use of an
exculpatory declaration against penal interest). The rare inroads made against this prohibition usually involved declarations against interest offered by the defense inculpating
the declarant and exculpating the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Letterich, 413 Ill. 2d
172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952), and other cases cited by MCCORMICK, supra at 823 n.7. The
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do not recognize a hearsay exception permitting the use of "thirdparty inculpatory declarations against penal interest."
A hypothetical example illustrates the concern of this article.
Assume that state X has jointly charged Able and Baker with murder. Under police interrogation, Able had given a full confession of
his own role while also implicating Baker. Assume further that,
under the applicable United States Supreme Court precedents,
Able's accusations against Baker are deemed sufficiently reliable, so
that state X's admission of Able's confession as evidence against
Baker would not violate the Confrontation Clause, even though
Baker has no opportunity to cross-examine Able. Assume, however,
that state X has no hearsay exception allowing Able's confession to
be used as evidence against Baker.
The issue discussed in this article is now posed: can the state of
X put Able and Baker on trial jointly and admit Able's confession,
including those portions which implicate Baker, while instructing
the jury not to consider Able's confession as evidence against
Baker? Or does such a procedure violate the Confrontation Clause
where Able does not testify and is unavailable for crossexamination?
In such a case, prosecutors might argue that if the Confrontation Clause would permit state X to instruct the jury to use Able's
confession as evidence against Baker, then the courts logically canfew instances where prosecutors successfully introduced declarations against interest
typically involved situations where in the case against A, the prosecution was required to
establish that someone other than A committed an offense, for example, in accountability cases or possession of stolen property cases. See infra note 12.
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the use of both exculpatory and inculpatory
declarations against penal interest. If the declarant is "unavailable," as defined in Rule
804(a), then under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), a hearsay exception exists where:
A statement which ... at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject the
declarant to ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. [Such
(a)] statement ... offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Nevertheless, approximately six "Federal Rules" states continue to exclude inculpatory declarations against penal interest. G. JOSEPH & S.
SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA, THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES

16 (1987) (listing

Arkansas, Florida, Main, Nevada, North Dakota and Vermont). Presumably, most of
those states which have not adopted a version of the Federal Rules also retain the common law prohibition. However, New York, a "non-Federal Rules" jurisdiction, on rare
occasions permits the prosecution to use such statements. See infra note 94. California
limits admissibility of A's statement as evidence against B to those parts that are specifically disserving to A's interest, in effect rejecting use of "collateral" portions of declarations against interest. See People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 541 P.2d 296, 311, 124
Cal. Rptr. 752, 767 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 926 (1976) (narrowly construing CAL.
EvID. CODE § 1230 (West 1966)). See also infra note 12.
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not find a Confrontation Clause violation where state X instructs the
jury not to use Able's confession as evidence against Baker, even if
the jury is likely to disregard the limiting instruction. The prosecutors would assert that a defacto use cannot violate the Confrontation
Clause where the same clause would permit a dejure use.
We conclude that as long as confrontation rather than procedural fairness remains the rationale for the Bruton result, such a
prosecutorial argument should succeed. Under such circumstances,
a trial judge should be required neither to sever Able's trial from
Baker's trial nor to find some other solution to the Bruton problem,
such as redacting Able's confession to exclude all references to
Baker.' I This is so even if, applying the state X hearsay prohibition,
the trial judge will exclude Able's confession as evidence against
Baker, while using a limiting instruction of the very type deemed
constitutionally inadequate in Bruton.
Such a conclusion would revolutionize Bruton doctrine in jurisdictions which recognize no hearsay exception for third-party inculpatory declarations against interest. It would add a new and
complex level of analysis to every codefendant confession case in
which an accused has advanced an otherwise meritorious Bruton
claim. 12 Where domestic law prohibits use of a codefendant's con11 Concerning possible alternatives to severance, see infra note 87.
12 In Bruton situations, courts are concerned about the "collateral" portion of a declaration against interest. For example, when A says, "I fired the gun while B stood lookout," the reference to B's conduct is collateral to the declaration against interest. That
portion is not truly against the declarant's interest. Those who would admit the collateral portion of declarations against interest suggest that the declarant against interest is
in a truth-telling mood so that his or her entire statement is normally reliable. See J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1465 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974) (discussion in context of declarations against pecuniary interest). CompareJefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1944) (noting that Wigmore's
rationale logically would require admission of those portions of a codefendant's confession which implicate a defendant, a result which ProfessorJefferson assumed was totally
unacceptable and which Wigmore himself did not urge-see J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1477, at 290, § 1076, at 116 (3d ed. 1940)).
In some instances, third-party declarations are "non-collateral." For example, A's
admission, "I stole the television," would be relevant to B's prosecution for possession
of stolen property even though it directly implicates A. This is because the state has to
establish in B's prosecution that the property in question was stolen. Similarly, where B
is alleged to be accountable for A's act of arson, A's declaration, "I set fire to the building," can be very probative where B denies that the fire was of human origin. Courts
have held that in such situations Bruton is inapplicable because the declarant has not
accused the defendant. See generally Haddad, supra note 6, at 20-25 (providing a discussion of the cases and a criticism of this limitation). See also Rawls v. Patton, 585 F. Supp.
181, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting debate over whether Bruton should apply where the
codefendant's statement harms the defendant by admitting that a crime was committed
but does not implicate the defendant in the crime). Some states, even those without a
general declaration against penal interest hearsay exception, have recognized hearsay
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fession as evidence against a defendant, courts resolving Bruton
claims would have to determine whether the Confrontation Clause
would have permitted such a use.1 3 The time and energy needed to
evaluate the prosecution's contention provide one reason for courts
to mandate severance under a procedural fairness theory where
Bruton's confrontation rationale would permit utilization of an ineffective limiting instruction at ajoint trial. More importantly, courts
should require severance under a procedural fairness rationale to
prevent an inadequate limiting instruction procedure from subverting ajurisdiction's rules of evidence by permitting jury consideration of a codefendant's inadmissible hearsay accusation against a
defendant.
II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANOMALY

DOUGLAS AND BRUTON

A common misconception is that Bruton interpreted the Confrontation Clause so as to prohibit the use of a codefendant's confession or admission as evidence against a defendant. 14 This
exceptions permitting use of certain "non-collateral" third-person declarations against
interest. See, e.g., Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 523-25 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1086 (1972) (discussing Texas hearsay exception). For a good definition of terminology classifying various sorts of declarations against interest, see Comment, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CAL. L. REv.
1189, 1190 n.7 (1978).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 148-149. Theoretically, if the conclusion
reached in the article is correct, even in jurisdictions which have a declaration against
penal interest exception to the rule against hearsay, a court which concluded that a particular accusation did not fit within the domestic law exception would have to determine
whether use of that statement would violate the Confrontation Clause in order to determine whether Bruton requires severance. However, the authors know of no decision
where a court in such ajurisdiction has concluded that the state hearsay analysis yields a
different result than the federal confrontation analysis. Where prosecutors have offered
declarations against penal interest, courts in such jurisdictions usually have assumed
that the requirements for domestic law admissibility are identical to the requirements
under the Confrontation Clause. They often have done so by reading into Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(3) a requirement of corroboration for inculpatory declarations against penal interest. See S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 804, at 966-68 (4th ed.
1986). See also State v. Myren, 133 Wis. 2d 430, 435, 395 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1986) (hearsay analysis is "academic"); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d
1092, 1100 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982) (" [Wjhere the confrontation
clause is implicated, it will tend inevitably to place the threshold of admissibility under
the applicable hearsay exception at a level that will pass constitutional muster"). Contra
People v. Rios, 163 Cal. App. 3d 852, 866, 210 Cal. Rptr. 271, 279 (1985) (raising
possibility, in dictum, that California hearsay exception might be satisfied but that Confrontation Clause would be violated).
14 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1974), which asserted that "Bruton held
that the admission of the extrajudicial hearsay statement of one co-defendant violated
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"sloppy reading"' 5 of Bruton might explain why courts and commentators have focused little attention upon the issue discussed in
this paper. If the proposition were true, this issue would not arise.
When Bruton was before the Court in 1968, many people may
have assumed that use of a codefendant's confession as evidence
against a defendant would violate the Confrontation Clause. Three
years earlier, while applying the clause to state prosecutions for the
first time, the Supreme Court in Pointerv. Texas 1 6 had declared that
"the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witness against him."' 17 In
fact, however, the Bruton Court avoided the question of whether the
Confrontation Clause would have prohibited the use of the Evans'
statements as evidence against Bruton.18 Instead, the decision
rested upon the explicit assumption that under domestic law, the confession of 'codefendant Evans was inadmissible against defendant
Bruton. 19
The Bruton story began in 1965 with Douglas v. Alabama,20 decided the same day as Pointer. In Douglas the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, had read aloud the confession of a separately tried
accomplice, under the guise of examining the accomplice. 2 ' The accomplice had refused to answer questions, invoking his privilege
against self-incrimination. 22 The Supreme Court held that the defendant's inability to cross-examine his alleged accomplice concerning the out-of-court accusations "plainly" denied Douglas "the right
23
of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause."
Although the reading of the confession and the refusal to answer
questions "were not technically testimony,"'2 4 the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice violated the Confrontation Clause because "the jury might improperly infer both that the
the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment." See also Comment, The Sixth Amendment Right of Defendants to Confront Adverse Witnesses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1547, 1562
(1989), where the student wrote, "[s]imply stated, the rule of Bruton prohibits admissibility of a hearsay statement by one codefendant against another.., if the codefendant
does not testify at trial."
15 See Comment, supra note 12, at 1196.
16 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
17 Id. at 404.
18 Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 39-45.
20 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
21 Id at 416.
22 Id. at 416-17.
23 Id. at 419.
24 Id.
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statement had been made and that it was true."' 2 5 When Douglas reasoned that the procedure was the equivalent of admitting the accomplice's confession as evidence against the defendant and
concluded that the procedure violated the Confrontation Clause,
the Court assumed that admission of a codefendant's out-of-court
confession as evidence against a defendant would violate the Con26
frontation Clause.
The Bruton Court later observed that Douglas had involved "circumstances analogous" to Bruton's case. 2 7 George Bruton and William Evans were convicted by a jury in a joint trial on a federal
charge of armed postal robbery. 28 A postal inspector had testified
that he had obtained oral confessions from Evans during the course
29
of interrogations at the city jail where Evans had been in custody.
The postal inspector claimed that Evans had admitted that he had
an accomplice, and that, in a second confession, Evans had identified Bruton as that accomplice.3 0 The Court of Appeals, relying on
Delli Paoli v. United States, 3 ' affirmed Bruton's conviction because the
trial judge had adequately instructed the jury to disregard the con32
fession of Evans in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence.
The Bruton majority expressly overruled Delli Paoli and reversed
Bruton's conviction. The Court reasoned as follows: first, when the
hearsay evidence is a codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant, an instruction to the jury to disregard that hearsay in the
Id.
Id. at 419-20. The Court perhaps could have reached the same result by saying that,
whether or not the Confrontation Clause prohibited use of an accomplice's confession
as evidence against a defendant, once Alabama shaped its domestic evidence law to disallow such use, it violated fundamental fairness for an Alabama trial court to use a procedure fraught with the danger that the jury would do what state law prohibited. The
Court, however, did not employ such a due process analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 138-140 (discussing procedural fairness approach that would prevent a court from
subverting its own jurisdiction's rules of evidence).
27 Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
28 Id. at 124.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
32 Evans v. U.S., 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Delli Paoli
had held that, under certain circumstances, a limiting instruction would adequately protect a defendant from ajury's misuse of a codefendant's confession. Delli Paoli, 352 U.S.
at 241-42; Note, The Admission of a Co-Defendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The
Questions and a Proposalfor Their Resolution, 1970 DuKE L. REv. 329, 332 n.22. Delli Paoli
had rejected the conclusive presumption that a limiting instruction was adequate in all
codefendant confession cases; it thus rejected the approach of Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539, 541 (1947).
25

26
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case against the defendant is likely to be ineffective; 3 3 second, admission of the confession in a joint jury trial is, therefore, a defacto
admission of the confession as evidence against the nonconfessing
defendant;3 4 and third, because the confession is both "inevitably
suspect" 3 5 and "devastating" 3 6 to the defendant's case, this defacto
admission of the confession without the test of cross-examination
37
violates the defendant's right of confrontation.
Having deemed accomplice confessions inherently suspect, and
having referred to their "unreliability," 38 the Court, nevertheless,
withheld judgment as to whether a trial judge's decision to admit a
codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant would violate the Confrontation Clause:
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner
was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence, . . . the problem arising only because the statement was ...
admissible against the declarant Evans .... There is not before us,
therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions
necessarily raise questions
39
under the Confrontation Clause.
The reservation of the question appeared to contradict the rationale of the Court's holding. The Court seemed to say that exclusion, through limiting instructions, of a codefendant's confession as
evidence against a defendant violates the Confrontation Clause
where there is a danger that, disregarding the instructions, a jury
will use the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant; 4 0 nevertheless, the Court did not intimate a view whether
admission of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, under a recognized hearsay exception, would violate the
defendant's confrontation rights. It seemed to say that procedures
which amount to a defacto admission of a codefendant's confession
as evidence against a defendant violate the Confrontation Clause
although the dejure admission of the same codefendant's confession
41
against the defendant might not violate the Confrontation Clause.
The reservation also seemed to contradict the spirit of the decision. As the Court would note a few weeks later in Roberts v. Rus33 391 U.S. at 126-37. See infra note 119 (discussing this premise and its validity). See
also infra notes 70, 116, and 123 and accompanying text.
34 Id.

at 127.

35 Id. at 136.
36 Id.

37 Id. at 136-137.
38 Id. at 136.

39 Id. at 128 n.3.
40 Id. at 137.
41 Id. at 128 n.3, 137.
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42

the Bruton Court believed that the procedure it condemned
created "a serious risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not
have been reliably determined. '4 3 If defacto admission of a codefendant's confession was held to create a constitutionally impermissible risk of convicting an innocent defendant, how could the dejure
admission of an identical confession not be deemed to create the
same impermissible risk?
Notwithstanding this inconsistency, the Court chose not to
44
adopt the views expressed injustice Stewart's concurring opinion.
Justice Stewart argued that a "basic premise of the Confrontation
Clause," as reflected in cases like Pointer and Douglas, is that "certain
kinds of hearsay [citations omitted] are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to
give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever
instructions the trial judge might give. ' 4 5 He added that "[i]t is for
this very reason that an out-of-court accusation is universally conceded to be constitutionally inadmissible against the accused, rather
46
than admissible for the little it may be worth."
sell,

B.

DUTTON V. EVANS

In 1970, two years after Bruton, Justice Stewart departed from
his Bruton concurrence when he authored the plurality opinion in
Dutton v. Evans.4 7 Justice Stewart indicated that some post-arrest
out-of-court accusations made by one alleged offender may be admitted against a purported accomplice, without an opportunity for
48
cross-examination, and still not violate the Confrontation Clause.
In Dutton, Georgia prosecuted Alex Evans for the murder of three
police officers. 4 9 The court severed the Evans trial from the trial of
codefendant Williams. 50 A man named Shaw was one of the twenty
prosecution witnesses:
He testified that he and Williams had been fellow prisoners in the
federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, at the time Williams was
brought to Gwinnett County to be arraigned on the charges of murdering the police officers. Shaw said that when Williams was returned
to the penitentiary from the arraignment, he had asked Williams:
42 392 U.S. 293 (1968).

43 Id. at 295.
44 Id. at 295.

45 391 U.S. at 138 (Stewart, J, concurring) (emphasis added).
46 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
47 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
48 Id. at 83.
49 Id. at 76.

50 Id.
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"How did you make out in court?" and that Williams had responded,
"If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't
be in this now." 5 '
The defense made hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections to the use of Williams' out-of-court declaration against Evans. 52 The trial court rejected both objections, relying on a Georgia
hearsay statute that, atypically, allowed use of such jailhouse
5
declarations. 3
When the matter reached the United States Supreme Court, a
plurality of four declared that use of the hearsay was consonant with
the Confrontation Clause. 54 The plurality distinguished Bruton by
noting that the hearsay accusations against Bruton were not admissible under the governing domestic rules of evidence. 5 5 Deviating
from the thesis he had advanced in his Bruton concurrence, 5 6 Justice
Stewart observed for the plurality that Bruton had reserved the ques57
tion of when the use of hearsay violated the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Stewart's manner of distinguishing Bruton suggests that
if Williams and Evans had been prosecuted together in a joint jury
trial in a federal court, where the Williams statement would have
been inadmissible hearsay as to Evans, admission of Williams' statement for use solely against Williams, subject to a limiting instruction, would have violated Bruton. Accordingly, the anomaly
suggested in Bruton became clearer in Dutton: the Georgia court,
consistent with the Confrontation Clause, could admit the Williams
statement and instruct the jury that it could use the statement as
evidence against Evans (the dejure use approved in Dutton); however, the Georgia court would be deemed to violate the Confrontation Clause if it admitted the Williams accusation against Williams,
while directing the jury not to use that statement against Evans (the
defacto use seemingly condemned in Bruton).
Commentators and lower courts have not focused upon this
anomaly. 58 Instead, they have critically evaluated the Dutton "indicia
Id. at 77.
Id. at 77-78.
Georgia's hearsay exception for coconspirator statements extended to the "concealment" phase and, in Dutton, allowed use of a statement made by an incarcerated
coconspirator even though the statement did not promote concealment. Id. at 81. The
Supreme Court recognized that the statement would not be admissible under the coconspirator exception applicable in federal courts. Id.
54 Id. at 83.
55 Id. at 85-86.
56 See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
57 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86.
58 In 1980, one of the present coauthors discussed the anomaly briefly. See Haddad,
supra note 6, at 18-20. More recently, Professor Seidelson wrote that two lines of con51
52
53
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of reliability" approach for judging whether, in the absence of an
opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the hearsay declarant' the use for its truth of another's out-of-court statement violates
the right to confront witnesses. 5 9
In providing the fifth vote needed to sustain the actions of the
Georgia trial judge, Justice Harlan in Dutton declared that the Confrontation Clause was not meant to control the scope of the rules of
evidence.6 0 He concluded that the admission of hearsay against a
criminal defendant is constitutional unless such admission would
deny the defendants a fair trial in contravention of the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 1 Relying upon English cases
dating to 1663, Justice Harlan stated that he would be prepared "to
hold as a matter of due process that a confession of an accomplice
resulting from formal police interrogation cannot be introduced as
evidence of the guilt of an accused, absent some circumstances indicating [the accused's] authorization or adoption" of the declarant's
statement. 6 2 Dutton, however, did not involve a police-elicited statement; but, instead, it involved a statement allegedly made to the defrontation cases have proceeded on parallel tracks, one involving single defendants, the
other multiple defendants. Without specifically discussing the anomaly, he suggests that
the two lines of cases may meet someday. See Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the
Supreme Court: Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 86-88 (1988).
We sense that Professor Seidelson's position is that Bruton problems disappear where
the admission of a codefendant's statement as evidence against a defendant would not
violate the Confrontation Clause. Apparently no other commentator has discussed the
anomaly or responded to Professor Haddad's 1980 observations.
59 See, e.g., Kirst, The ProceduralDimension of ConfrontationDoctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485
(1987); Jonakit, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV.
557 (1988); M. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1988); Note, Reconciling the
Conflict Between the CoconspiratorExemptionfrom the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clauseof
the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294 (1985); Comment, The Confrontation Clause
and the Hearsay Rule: A ProblematicRelationship in Need of a PracticalAnalysis, 14 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 949 (1987).

Older commentary concerning confrontation theory includes K. Graham, The Right
of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL.
99 (1972); Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the HearsayRules and Due Process-A Proposalfor
Determining When Hearsay Way Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidencefor Criminal Cases, 91
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1978); Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say on Hearsay, 13 UCLA L. REV. 366 (1966).
Most commentators are critical of the Court's declaration that "indicia of reliability" can substitute for cross-examination so as to fulfill the Confrontation Clause guaranty. This criticism is wholly apart from their view of whether courts should require the
prosecution to demonstrate the unavailability of the hearsay declarant before allowing it
to introduce a hearsay declaration. See infra note 53.
60 Dutton, 400 U.S. at 94.
61 Id. at 94-99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 98 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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clarant's own friend or associate. 63 Justice Harlan concluded that
due process is not offended when the court admits, under a declaration against interest hearsay exception, codefendant statements
64
which are not elicited through formal police interrogation.
Justice Marshall dissented, and was joined by Justices Brennan
(author of Bruton), Black, and Douglas. 6 5. Justice Marshall argued
that, in the absence of a defense opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, use of an incriminatory extrajudicial statement of an al66
leged accomplice violates the defendant's right of confrontation.
Marshall deemed it irrelevant whether the hearsay statement was
67
made "during official interrogation."
The Dutton dissenters viewed the majority's opinion as inconsistent with Douglas and Bruton. Justice Marshall interpreted Bruton as if
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Bruton had prevailed: use of
an alleged fellow offender's statement as evidence against a defendant violates the defendant's right of confrontation, at least where, at
trial, the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the fellow
68
offender.
If either the views of Justice Harlan or those of the Evans dissenters had prevailed, there would be no tension between Bruton
and Dutton. Under either approach, the Constitution would require
severance, or some other solution to the Bruton problem, 69 only in
cases where the Constitution, as distinguished from domestic hearsay
law, requires the exclusion of the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant. Justice Harlan and the dissenters differed only as to when and under what theory the Constitution would
70
require such exclusion.
63 Id. at 77.
64 Id. at 99-100

(Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Concerning other possible solutions, see infra note 87.
70 Justice Harlan in Dutton did not abandon the position he had taken while joining
Justice White's dissent in Bruton: a limiting instruction may be adequate to prevent a
jury from using one defendant's confession as evidence against a codefendant. Bruton,
391 U.S. 123, 138-44 (White, J., dissenting). The Bruton dissent in which Harlanjoined
attacked the reliability of one defendant's police-elicited confession in so far as it implicated a codefendant, so that Harlan's views in Bruton were consistent with those he expressed in Dutton.
The Dutton dissenters, through Justice Marshall, observed that the result in Bruton
could be avoided on a "wholesale" basis by an interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause which often would allow prosecutors to use a codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against a defendant. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, three of the four justices who dissented in Dutton later abandoned their
65
66
67
68
69
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The tension, however, remained under the plurality approach.
Read in light of Bruton, the plurality definitely suggested that, in the
absence of some other solution to the Bruton' problem, such as redaction or a prosecutor's willingness not to offer the confession
even as evidence against the confessing codefendant, the Confrontation Clause required severance in codefendant confession cases
where domestic law prohibited use of the codefendant's cross-implicating statement, even though the Constitution did not require such
exclusion.
C.

LEE AND EARNEST

In 1986, Lee v. Illinois71 reaffirmed Bruton's confrontation rationale and its emphasis upon the ineffectiveness of an instruction
directing the jury to disregard an accomplice's confession that is
both "inevitably suspect" and "devastating" to the defendant's
case. 72 However, the Court distinguished Bruton on the ground that
the case before it, arising from a bench trial, did not involve the
effectiveness of a limiting instruction. 73 Indeed, the Court stated
that the only question for consideration was "whether [the] substantive use of the hearsay confession denied Petitioner rights guaranteed her under the Confrontation Clause."' 74 In resolving this issue,
the Court concluded that an accomplice's inculpatory declarations
are presumptively unreliable, but that this presumption may be
overcome where sufficient "indicia of reliability" are present to en75
sure their trustworthiness.
position in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 633 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting), where
they argued that the result in Bruton depended upon the assumption that a codefendant's confession was inadmissible against the defendant under domestic law without regard to whether its use against the defendant would have violated the defendant's right
to confront witnesses. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
71 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
72 Id. at 542 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136).
73 Id. at 542.
74 Id. at 539. Having no hearsay exception for inculpatory declarations against penal
interest, Illinois law prohibits use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a
defendant. See generally People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400, 530 N.E. 2d 423 (1988); People v. Collins, 184 Ill.
App. 3d 321, 539 N.E. 2d 736, appealdenied, 127 Ill. 2d 624 (1989);
People v. Schmitt, 173 Ill. App. 3d 66, 527 N.E. 2d 384 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 131
Ill. 2d 128, 545 N.E. 2d 665 (1989). See also Haddad, supra note 6, at 11-12 nn.48-49. In
a joint bench trial, Lee's trial judge erroneously relied upon the Thomas confession in
assessing the guilt of Lee. Lee, 476 U.S. at 538. The Illinois Appellate Court compounded the error by holding that the Thomas confession was admissible against Lee
because it interlocked with Lee's own confession. In making this ruling, the court relied
on Illinois cases which held merely that severance was not required under these circumstances. Id. at 538-39. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that it was
without authority to reverse an Illinois court for misinterpreting Illinois law. Id. at 539.
75 The Lee majority held that the confession of codefendant Thomas, when used as
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Thus, in dictum, even the more liberal members of the Court in
Lee appeared to embrace much of the indicia-of-reliability jurispruevidence against defendant Lee, "did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia of reliability' " to meet Confrontation Clause standards. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980)). The four dissenters agreed with the majority in Lee: sometimes the Constitution permits the prosecution to use a codefendant's confession as evidence against a
defendant. Lee, 476 U.S. at 549. They appeared to depart not so much as to the standard used to determine when such admission would be constitutionally proper, but
rather in the application of the standard to the facts of the case. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Reliability may not be the only relevant concern. Issues may arise as to the availability of the hearsay declarant. Where the prosecution in a joint trial attempts to introduce one defendant's confession as evidence against a codefendant under a declaration
against interest hearsay exception, it probably need not demonstrate the unavailability
of the hearsay declarant in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. This is because a
showing of unavailability is unnecessary where the rationale for a hearsay exception is
that the circumstances surrounding the making of a hearsay statement tend to guarantee
its trustworthiness. See United v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986), rejecting dictum in
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, which had suggested that a showing of the declarant's unavailability is always essential to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
On the other hand, a showing of unavailability is still required to satisfy the domestic
law declaration against interest hearsay exception. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 804. When the
prosecution seeks to use codefendant A's confession as evidence in its case-in-chief
against defendant B, should the law consider A to be unavailable? justice Stevens once
suggested that A is available because the prosecution has the power to grant A immunity.
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 87 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). By contrastJustice
Blackmun, joined by three other justices, apparently was willing to presume that a codefendant is unavailable as a prosecution witness when he himself is on trial. Lee, 476 U.S.
at 549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Reviewing courts rather routinely say that a codefendant who did not testify on his
own behalf was unavailable to the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d
92, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument that non-defendant declarant who claims
the fifth amendment privilege is nevertheless available to the prosecution because of its
power to secure an order of immunity); United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 361 (7th
Cir. 1986) (dictum suggesting same result as in Lang); United States v. Osticco, 580 F.
Supp. 484, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1984), aft'd, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1158 (1985) (following Lang in case of jointly indicted but not jointly tried defendant
who invoked the privilege). See also United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 771 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (non-defendant declarant unavailable because he
invoked fifth amendment privilege). Contra United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282, 1286
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977) (suggesting that non-defendant declarant could be rendered available at little cost if the prosecution granted the declarant
immunity). The parties debated the issue of the availability of a codefendant in Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987). See Brief for Petitioner at 19 n.8, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186;
Brief for Respondent at 32-33, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186. The Court's opinion, however,
made no reference to this debate.
Courts may deem a witness unavailable, without discussing the immunity possibility,
simply because that witness invoked his or her fifth amendment privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Dunn, 758 F.2d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 1985); Mattes v. Gagnon, 700 F.2d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 383 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (dictum); People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 402, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 856, 749 P.2d 279, 293 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People v. Thomas, 68 N.Y.2d 194, 196, 507 N.Y.S.2d
973, 975, 500 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987). A codefendant
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dence of the plurality opinion of Dutton. In so doing, the Court assumed that under some limited circumstances, though not in Lee,
the Confrontation Clause permits use of a codefendant's confession
as substantive evidence against a defendant.7 6 Hence, in Lee, all
nine justices agreed that, depending upon the precise substance of
the confession made by codefendant Thomas, the prosecution, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, could have introduced the
Thomas confession as evidence against defendant Lee, if domestic
law so permitted. 77 Although two of the Dutton dissenters, Justices
Marshall and Brennan, remained on the Court, the indicia-of-reliability approach of the Dutton four-person plurality now commanded
unanimity.
Accordingly, the tension grew. The Court in Lee seemed to indicate that, under some circumstances, an instruction telling a jury
not to consider a codefendant's confession in adjudicating a defendant's guilt was a defacto use of the confession, which would violate
the defendant's confrontation rights; yet an instruction directing the
jury to consider the same confession as evidence against the defendant (the dejure use) would not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights.
The only way to escape this anomaly would be to hold that
Bruton is applicable only where the Confrontation Clause would prohibit the de jure admission of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant. This would require an individualized
scrutiny of the reliability of the particular codefendant confession.
However, the Bruton court had not so scrutinized the confession of
codefendant Evans. Nor had it suggested that such scrutiny was
necessary before the Court could determine whether the limiting instruction procedure violated the Confrontation Clause.
may be deemed unavailable simply because he or she did not testify. See, e.g., United
States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1985).
The authors believe that trial courts should require the prosecution to call the confessing codefendant, out of the jury's presence, to determine whether the codefendant
will refuse to testify, before the prosecution will be deemed to have satisfied the domestic law requirement of unavailability. In this we agree with seven Fifth Circuit judges
who dissented from an en banc ruling in Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 549 (5th Cir.
1972) (Rives,J., dissenting). We do not believe the prosecution need grant the defendant immunity. If the codefendant declines to testify for the prosecution but later testifies
on his own behalf, we do not believe that his belated availability should destroy the
prosecution's earlier invocation of a domestic law declaration against interest hearsay
exception. "Unavailability" should be measured at the time the prosecution offers the
declarant's statement.
76 See supra the first paragraph of note 75.
77 Lee, 476 U.S. at 543; id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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After Lee, the Supreme Court in New Mexico v. Earnest78 granted
the prosecution's certiorari petition and, in a single sentence, remanded to the New Mexico Supreme Court 79 a case in which the
prosecution argued that, consistent with the Confrontation Clause,
a trial judge could admit a codefendant's police-elicited confession
as evidence against a defendant under a declaration against interest
hearsay exception.8 0 Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice
O'Connor.8 ' He noted that, under Lee, lack of cross-examination of
a hearsay declarant is not necessarily violative of the Confrontation
Clause. He added, "the State is entitled to an opportunity to overcome the weighty presumption of unreliability attaching to codefendant statements by demonstrating that the particular statement
at issue bears sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to satisfy Confrontation
82
Clause concerns."
Under the view expressed in the concurring Earnest opinion, the
Bruton-severance-confrontation anomaly was apparent. If New Mexico law prohibited use of a codefendant's confession against a defendant, in the absence of redaction or some other solution, Bruton
arguably required severance lest the procedure violate the defendant's right of confrontation. If, however, state law permitted use of
the codefendant's accusation as evidence against a defendant, the
procedure would not violate the Confrontation Clause if sufficient
"indicia of reliability" surrounded the hearsay declaration so as to
overcome the presumption of unreliability.
D.

THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS

The degree to which a declaration against interest theory could
erode Bruton depends upon the frequency of the prosecution's success in convincing courts that declarations against interest are reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Despite the result
in Lee, post-Lee decisions in state and federal reviewing courts suggest that the prosecution often will prevail in contending that a particular third-party declaration against interest is reliable enough to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Numerous decisions have con78 77 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam).
79 Id.

80 New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986).
81 Id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Significantly, O'Connor had been among
the majority ofjustices who had agreed in Lee that the use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against Lee had violated the Confrontation Clause. Lee, 476 U.S. at
546.
82 Earnest, 477 at 649-50 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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cluded that the prosecution has overcome the presumption of unreliability described in Lee. 83 A minority of these decisions, including
the Earnest case on remand, have allowed use of statements made by
a declarant at a time when the.declarant knew that he or she was
dealing with the authorities, either during custodial police interrogation or while entering a plea of guilty.8 4 A few of these decisions
85
have involved statements of codefendants.
In jurisdictions that admit inculpatory declarations against penal interest, admission of the codefendant's "constitutionally reliable" confession as evidence against a defendant will avoid Bruton,
just as Justice Marshall predicted in Dutton.8 6 The Bruton limiting
instruction problem disappears once such a statement is admitted
against the defendant.
In those jurisdictions whose evidentiary rules would prohibit
use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, even though the Confrontation Clause would not mandate such
exclusion, the question remains whether Bruton requires severance
lest juries improperly consider against the defendant a statement of
a codefendant. The next section examines this question.
III.

THE ABSENCE OF A CONFRONTATION VIOLATION WHERE THE
CODEFENDANT'S STATEMENT, THOUGH CONSTITUTIONALLY
ADMISSIBLE, Is INADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT UNDER DOMESTIC LAW

Since Bruton, prosecutors have invoked a wide variety of theo-

87
ries in efforts to avoid severance in codefendant confession cases.
83 These cases include United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 369 (1989); United States
v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Scopo, 861 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1750 (1989); United States v.
Kusek, 844 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 157 (1988); United States v. Layton,
855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1989); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987); People v. Parks, 168 Ill. App. 3d 978, 523 N.E.2d
130 (1988); State v. Earnest, 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924
(1987); People v. Thomas, 68 N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293, 507 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987); State v. St. Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383
(1988) (declaration-against-interest theory approved as to some statements but not as to
others); State v. Anderson, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987).
84 See, e.g., Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413; Scopo, 861 F.2d 339; Earnest, 106 N. Mex. 411, 744
P.2d 539; Thomas, 68 N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293, 507 N.Y.S.2d 973; St. Pierre, 111
Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383.
85 See, e.g., Candoli, 870 F.2d 496; Parks, 168 Ill. App. 3d 978, 523 N.E.2d 130; St.
Pierre, 111 Wash. 2d 105, 759 P.2d 383.
86 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 107 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87 They have argued that Bruton is inapplicable in any one of a variety of circum-
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One would have thought, therefore, that, at least after the 1970 Dutton decision, 88 they would have argued in both the United States
Supreme Court and in the lower courts that Bruton requires severance, in the absence of some other remedy, only where the Confrontation Clause would have mandated the exclusion of the
codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant. They
surely would have contended that where domestic evidence rules
exclude the confession as evidence against the defendant, but where
the Confrontation Clause would not mandate exclusion, a limiting
instruction procedure is adequate and does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Thousands of post-Dutton, pre-Lee decisions, from 1970 to
1986, however, appeared not to reflect such an argument.8 9 Perhaps prosecutors paid too little attention to the theory underlying
the decisions. Perhaps they acquiesced in the "sloppy reading" of
Bruton as holding that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the use of
a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant. 90 In
any event, rarely before Cruz v. New York 9 t in 1987 did prosecutors
advance such an argument. Even so, the Cruz Court did not reach
stances, for example: 1) where the case is tried without a jury; 2) where the confessing
codefendant testifies; 3) where the defendant has himself confessed; 4) where the codefendant's statement is admissible against the defendant as non-hearsay or under a hearsay exception such as those for excited utterances or coconspirator declarations; 5)
where the statement of the codefendant on its face does not implicate the defendant; 6)
where the court has redacted the codefendant's statement to mask references to the
defendant. Moreover, many prosecutors have avoided completely separate trials by using a "dual" jury procedure or by agreeing not to use the confession even as against the
confessing defendant. See generally Garcia, supra note 6 at 401 (discussing various meth-

ods of avoiding Bruton); Haddad, supra note 2,at 3-33 (discussing subdoctrines arising
after Bruton).

88 400 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra note 9.
89 See infra note 91.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 14-42.

91 481 U.S. 186 (1987). Michigan authorities also made a similar argument before
the United States Supreme Court in the October, 1986 term. See discussion of Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) infra note 96. Of course, we cannot say for certain
how often prosecutors in lower courts advanced this argument before Cruz. However, in
connection with his participation in a continuing legal education program since 1971,
coauthor Haddad has systematically reviewed state and federal reviewing court decisons
treating Bruton issues. He has noted very few cases before Cruz where a court even arguably addressed such an argument.
One exception was United States v. CogweIl, 486 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974). There the district court admitted statements allegedly made
by defendant Pugh to his friends. Id. at 832. The statements implicated codefendant
Fort. Id. The trial court ruled them inadmissible hearsay as to Fort and instructed the
jury to consider them only as evidence against Pugh. Id. The reviewing court, applying
Dutton, found the statements to meet the "indicia of reliability" test. Id. at 834. Accordingly, it held that the limiting instruction procedure did not violate the Confrontation
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the issue. 9 2 Since lower courts similarly have not spoken on the issue, we have little guidance as to how courts might react to such an
argument.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

In Cruz v. New York, the State of New York, supported by the
United States as amicus, presented the claim that no Bruton violation
had occurred because the Confrontation Clause would not have
prohibited the use of the codefendant's admissions as evidence
against the defendant. 93 In Cruz, the state trial judge, applying New
York law, had limited use of the codefendant's statement to the codefendant alone. 9 4 The Cruz majority, through Justice Scalia, without pausing to acknowledge the argument, reversed on Bruton
grounds. 9 5 The Court refused to consider the State's argument, apparently because the State had not presented to the New York
96
courts this defense to the Bruton claim.
Clause, id., even though it assumed arguendo that no hearsay exception would permit
the use of the Pugh statements as evidence against Fort. Id. at 832 n.5.
It also appears that after Lee but before Cruz, the prosecution in United States v.
Kurka, 818 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987), appealafter remand, 867 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1989),
sought to avoid a Bruton problem by arguing that the statement of Combs, which had
been admitted solely against Combs, was reliable enough as to defendant Kurka so that
its admission against Kurka would not have violated Kurka's confrontation rights. Id. at
1431. The court responded by concluding that the statement failed to bear adequate
indicia of reliability to satisfy the Dutton standard. Id. at 1432.
92 The Cruz opinion makes no reference at all to the prosecution's argument.
93 Brief of Respondent at 36-38, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186; Brief of Amicus Curiae United
States of America in Support of Respondent at 10-18, Cruz, 481 U.S. at 186. The Solicitor General phrased the first issue as "whether the judgment can be supported on the
ground that the non-testifying co-defendant's confession was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Confrontation Clause." Id. at I.
94 Cruz, 481 U.S. at 189. New York domestic law permits prosecutors to use inculpatory declarations against interest under limited circumstances. People v. Thomas, 68
N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293, 507 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987);
People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978); People
v. Brensic, 119 A.D.2d 281, 506 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1986), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 509 N.E.2d
1226, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120, modified, 70 N.Y.2d 722, 513 N.E.2d 1302, 519 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1987); People v. Ryan, 121 A.D.2d 34, 509 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1059 (1987), vacated, 134 A.D.2d 300, 520 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1987); People v. Young, 122
A.D.2d 863, 505 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1986), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 517
N.Y.S.2d 120 (1987), modified, 70 N.Y.2d 722, 513 N.E.2d 1302, 519 N.Y.2d 641 (1987).
See also Goodman & Waltuch, DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest. The Majority Has Emerged,
21 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 51 (1983). However, the Cruz trial prosecutor did not offer the
codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant under this domestic law
hearsay exception. See People v. Cruz 70 N.Y.2d 733, 514 N.E.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 959
(1987), rev'd, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
95 Cruz, 481 U.S. at 194.
96 See id. at 189-94. During oral argument, in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200
(1987), when a Michigan prosecutor made a similar argument,Justice Scalia, through his
questioning, elicited the fact that the prosecution had not made the argument in the
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Thus far, only a few Supreme Court justices have written even
briefly concerning the claim that Bruton does not mandate severance
where domestic law prohibits use of a codefendant's hearsay accusations against a defendant, but where the Confrontation Clause
would not disallow such use. Their statements give us little insight
as to how the full Court would resolve the matter if the Court
squarely confronted the issue.
In 1974, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Parker v. Randolph,9 7 alluded to a situation where a state court has prohibited use of a codefendant's statement as evidence against a defendant even though
such use would not violate the Confrontation Clause. 98 He suggested that in such a case an issue would arise as to whether the use
of limiting instructions in a joint trial would violate the Confrontation Clause, 9 9 but he did not resolve the question.' 0 0
courts below. See 41 Grim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4156 (1987). The question of waiver also
arose at oral argument in Cruz. Transcript of Argument at 33-35. Even though a re-

spondent normally can sustain ajudgment based upon any ground which appears in the
record, some decisions recognize an exception where the petitioner, for lack of fair notice of respondent's theory, did not have an adequate opportunity to develop the record.
Compare United States v. New York Tel., 434 U.S. 159, 166 n.8 (1977) (court has discretion to consider any basis for supporting the judgment below even if the prevailing party
did not advance the claim in the court below) with Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814-15
n.1 (1985) (court declined to consider argument which appellee had not made in court
below) and Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981) (court would not consider appellee's argument where appellee expressly refused to advance such argument in court below). A middle ground is for the reviewing court to remand for an evidentiary hearing
on the point not originally developed at trial. See Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224
(1972). In Combs, the prosecution had won in trial court on the merits of a fourth
amendment claim without challenging defendant's standing, id. at 227; when the prosecution defended the trial court's judgment on the alternative ground of "no standing,"
the Supreme Court remanded to permit litigation of the standing question. Id. at 228.
Presumably, the petitioner in Cruz was deprived of a fair opportunity to make a record
demonstrating the unreliability of his codefendant's statement. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
Cruz held that there is no exception to Bruton where each defendant has made a
substantially similar statement which, under domestic law, is admissible against the declarant but not against his or her codefendant. Presumably, because of the prosecution's procedural default, Cruz did not consider whether a different result would follow if
one defendant's statement was reliable enough to be admitted against the codefendant
without violating his or her confrontation rights. Interestingly, while arguing that the
issue was not properly before the Court, that the codefendant's confession was not reliable as to defendant Cruz, and that the declarant was available to the prosecution, Petitioner Cruz did not challenge the respondent's contention that Bruton is inapplicable
where the trial court, under domestic law, excluded the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant, but the Confrontation Clause would have allowed such
use.
97 442 U.S. at 62, 81 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Justice Stevens, at least as of 1974, believed that the Confrontation Clause re-
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In 1986, Justice Blackmun seemingly suggested in his Lee dissent that Bruton is inapplicable where the Confrontation Clause
would not prohibit use of the codefendant's confession as evidence
against a defendant. In a footnote, he wrote: "The Bruton rule thus
necessarily applies only to situations in which the out-of-court state10
ments are constitutionally inadmissible against the defendant." '
Justice Blackmun did not offer an argument in support of this
claim, which appeared to contradict the implications to be drawn
from Bruton, the Dutton plurality, the Lee majority, and the Earnest
concurrence. 10 2 Moreover, the context in which Justice Blackmun
made this assertion weighs against a definitive conclusion that he
meant that Bruton would not require severance, even if domestic law
prohibited admission, of the codefendant's statement against the defendant, as long as the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit admissibility. In the same footnote, Justice Blackmun, without referring
to a sixth amendment objection, stressed that because of domestic
law, the codefendant's statement was not admitted against defendant Bruton. 0 3 Moreover, he cited a case which holds that where a
codefendant's statement, under domestic law, is admitted against a
10 4
defendant, there is no Bruton problem.
Despite this context, and although no Bruton limiting instruction problem faced the Lee Court in reviewing a conviction from a
trial without ajury, perhaps Justice Blackmun simply meant what he
said when he indicated that the constitutional inadmissibility of the
codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant is a prerequisite for a Bruton claim.' 0 5 However, the reader of'Justice Blackmun's Lee dissent simply cannot be certain.
Dissenting in Cruz, Justice White cited with approval Justice
quires a showing of the unavailability of the hearsay declarant before a declaration

against penal interest could be received against a third person. He argued that, because
it is armed with the power of immunity, the prosecution cannot demonstrate the unavailability of a person who is present in court as a defendant. See supra note 75.
Thus, under a Stevens approach, Bruton severance problems could not be avoided
by a claim that the use of codefendant's statement against the defendant would be constitutionally permissible. The issue would not arise because, in light of the availability of
the codefendant-declarant, the use of such evidence would always violate the defendant's confrontation rights.
101 Lee, 476 U.S. at 552 n.5. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 13-76.
103 Lee, 476 U.S. at 552 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S.
123 (1968)).
104 The case was United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 971 (1976).
105 See supra text accompanying note 100.

256

JAMES B. HADDAD AND RICHARD G. AGIN

[Vol. 81

Blackmun's assertion in Lee. 10 6 Justice White wrote that Lee "sug-

gest[s] that a codefendant's interlocking confession will often be admissible against the defendant, in which event there would not be
the Confrontation Clause issue Bruton identified."l 0 7 He added that
he read the majority opinion to permit New York courts on remand
to consider "the admissibility of that confession against Cruz."' 10 8
Justice White's comments are ambiguous. Admissibility has
two components. The use of a codefendant's confession against a
defendant must be permitted by a domestic law exception to the
hearsay rule. Beyond that, such use must not violate the Confrontation Clause. Was Justice White saying that there is no Bruton problem as long as a codefendant's admission would not violate the

Confrontation Clause even if domestic law prohibited use of the
statement? Or, was he making the unremarkable assertion that no
Bruton problem exists where a statement is actually admitted under a
domestic law exception to the hearsay rule where such statement is
sufficiently reliable to meet confrontation standards? The reader

cannot know for sure whether Justice White meant to address the
issue which is the focus of the present paper.
B.

STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURT OPINIONS

After Lee and Cruz, prosecutors have sometimes argued that
Bruton does not mandate severance unless the Confrontation Clause
would prohibit a trial court from admitting the codefendant's statement as evidence against a defendant.1 0 9 The prosecutors have
used this argument particularly during efforts to save convictions
where the trial court, before Cruz, had relied upon the later discredited interlocking confession exception to Bruton.'" 0
106 481 U.S. 186, 198-99 n.4, (White, J., dissenting) (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 553 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
107 481 U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting).
108 481 U.S. at 199 (White, J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g., People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d 388, 539 N.E.2d 1172 (1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 203 (1989); People v. Collins, 184 Ill. App. 3d 321, 539 N.E.2d 736 (1989);
People v. Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d 959, 523 N.E.2d 1160 (1988); People v. Parks, 168 Ill.
App. 3d 978, 523 N.E.2d 130 (1988); People v. Lincoln, 157 I1l. App. 3d 700, 510
App. 3d 459, 509 N.E.2d 563 (1987);
N.E.2d 1026 (1987); People v. Gibson, 156 Ill.
People v. Cruz, 70 N.Y.2d 733, 514 N.E.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1987), on remandfrom
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987); People v. Alvarado, 141 A.D.2d 738, 529
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1988).
110 In each case cited in supra note 109, with the possible exception of Collins, it appears that statements of both the defendant and the codefendant were admitted at a
joint trial, subject to a limiting instruction. Collins, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 328-30, 539
N.E.2d at 739-41. The Collins opinion is equivocal, but it suggests that the court there
also gave limiting instructions. Id. at 327, 539 N.E.2d at 740 (reference to limiting instructions in context of discussion of Bruton). The codefendant-appellant relied upon

1990]

BRUTON AND RELIABLE DECLARATIONS

257

In some instances, reviewing courts have told prosecutors that
it is too late to raise this claim for the first time in defending a conviction on appeal because, where the trial court under domestic law
excluded the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant, the parties had no occasion to litigate whether the codefendant's accusations against the defendant bore adequate indicia of
reliability so that their use would comport with the Confrontation
Clause. 1 1
In other instances, courts have rejected on the merits claims
that the codefendant's accusations were reliable enotigh so that
their use as evidence against the defendant would have satisfied the
Confrontation Clause.' 12 Perhaps an eager prosecutor would read
the latter cases as implicitly recognizing that no severance would
have been required if the codefendant's statement had been reliable
enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, even though domestic
law did not permit admission of the codefendant's statement against
the defendant. However, any such implication would be in the nature of dictum. Moreover, in most of these cases, the reviewing
court has not even paused to note the distinction between domestic
3
law admissibility and constitutional admissibility."
The cases do not include a clear statement declaring that even
though the trial judge excluded use of the codefendant's statement
as evidence against the defendant, and even though state law required such exclusion, Bruton would not command reversal unless
the Confrontation Clause would have required exclusion of the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant. None of
the lower court cases cite the previously discussed statements ofJusCruz in each of thesecases. Cruz had rejected an exception which had been accepted by
the plurality opinions in Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979). See supra note 96. In
each case, the prosecution responded by asserting that the statements were reliable
enough to overcome the presumption of unreliability described in Lee.
II See, e.g., Cruz, 70 N.Y.2d 733, 514 N.E.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 959; Alvarado, 141
A.D.2d 738, 529 N.Y.S.2d 835. Lincoln, 157 Ill. App. 3d 70, 510 N.E.2d 1026, was reversed for a new trial but suggested that the prosecution could make its indicia of reliability argument in the context of the new trial. See generally note 96.
112 See, e.g., Mahafey, 128 Ill. 2d 388, 539 N.E.2d 1172; Gibson, 156 Ill. App. 3d 459,
509 N.E.2d 563; Dixon, 169 Ill. App. 3d 959, 523 N.E.2d 1160.
113 The Illinois cases especially demonstrate enormous confusion. Despite a clear Illinois domestic law prohibition, see sdpra note 74, some post-Lee cases say that if the prosecution overcomes the Lee presumption of unreliability, the trial court can admit a
codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant. See, e.g., Collins, 184 Ill. App.
3d 321, 539 N.E.2d 130; Parks, 168 Ill. App. 3d 978, 523 N.E.2d 130; Lincoln, 157 Ill.
App. 3d 70, 510 N.E.2d 1026. But for this confusion, prosecutors could properly cite
Parks for the proposition that Bruton does not mandate severance where domestic law
excludes the codefendant's statement as evidence against the defendant as long as the
statement is reliable enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.

258

JAMES B. HADDAD AND RICHARD G. AGIN

[Vol. 81

tice Blackmun in Lee and Justice White in Cruz, even though these
are the only statements by Supreme Court justices which arguably
voice an opinion on the issue. 114 Thus the lower court decisions
shed no useful light on this important question.
C.

THE AUTHORS' VIEWS

At the outset, we state our bias: we favor the result reached in
Bruton. Once ajurisdiction decides for whatever reason that a codefendant's cross-implicating confession is inadmissible against a defendant, because alternatives such as severance and redaction exist,
its courts should not allow a prosecutor to place that confession
before the defendant's jury subject only to a presumptively ineffective limiting instruction. Residing in a state that reached the "Bruton
result" decades before Bruton-on procedural fairness grounds
rather than on confrontation grounds' 15-we are not troubled that
the Court invoked the Constitution to outlaw the limiting instruction procedure in both state and federal codefendant confession
cases. We wish, moreover, that courts would apply a procedural
fairness analysis to prevent the use of certain ineffective limiting instructions in other contexts. One of the authors has provided a detailed analysis of criteria arguably relevant to an assessment of the
6
fairness of various sorts of limiting instructions."
However, we do not believe that courts can properly interpret
the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the limiting instruction tech114

See supra text accompanying notes 101-108.

115 See Haddad, supra note 6, at 11-12 n.48-49; People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400, 530
N.E. 2d 423 (1988). Most pre-Bruton decisions which required severance in codefendant
confession cases did so from a concern that otherwise a jury would consider evidence
which the law deemed inadmissible. They did not do so because of a concern that denial
of severance would lead to the conviction of the innocent. Haddad, supra note 6, at 4445. Hence our reference to proceduralfairness.
116 Haddad, supra note 6, at 39-49. Claims that limiting instructions are likely to be
ineffective can arise in many contexts, such as where "other crime" evidence is admitted
solely on the question of the accused's motive; where evidence relevant only to sentencing is admitted before a jury in a unified proceeding to determine both guilt-innocence
and appropriate punishment, as in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); and where
the Miranda-violative statement of a defendant or the prior inconsistent statement of a
witness is admitted solely for impeachment. Which uses are so unfair that courts should
prohibit them? In his article, Professor Haddad considered five possible criteria for
evaluating the relative fairness of limiting instruction procedures: (1) the degree of ineffectiveness of the instruction; (2) the fact that if the jury disregarded the instruction it
would be considering constitutionally inadmissible evidence; (3) the degree of danger of
convicting an innocent person if the jury disregards the instruction; (4) the likely impact
of the evidence if the jury improperly considers it; and (5) the availability and costs of
alternatives to the limiting instruction procedure. He concluded that the fourth and
especially the fifth criteria are the most useful guides to comparing the relative fairness
of limiting instruction procedures. Haddad, supra note 6 at 49. See also infra note 138.
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nique where, despite a jurisdiction's domestic law bar against the
use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant,
the Confrontation Clause would not prohibit such a use.
One argument favoring our conclusion would assert that the
Supreme Court should not prohibit the "lesser" course of conduct
where it interprets the Constitution so as to permit the "greater."
Under that analysis, once the Court reads the Confrontation Clause
to allow the greater conduct, namely the admission of a codefendant's statement as evidence against a defendant, it cannot interpret
the same clause to prohibit the "lesser conduct," namely the exclusion of the evidence subject to a limiting instruction that might well
be ineffective.
This "greater includes the lesser" approach has been advanced
in several constitutional contexts, from free speech to the use of
presumptions in criminal cases. 11 7 However, courts do not always
accept the greater-lesser analysis in other areas; therefore, we
choose not to rely upon it. 118 Instead, we look to the terms of Bruton
itself.
According to Bruton, the worst thing that can happen under the
117 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478
U.S. 328, 346-47 n.10 (suggesting that the power to prohibit advertisement of a product
flows from the power to ban the product even if the legislature has chosen to permit its
sale); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (as long as legislature could create personal
liability for bank directors if circumstance B were present, the legislature can make directors liable if circumstance A is present and then can declare that evidence of circumstance B is prima facie evidence of circumstance A).
118 A state legislature could make the presence of mitigating circumstances reducing
murder to manslaughter a partial affirmative defense to murder, relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving the absence of these circumstances. However, once a state
defines the absence of those circumstances as an element of murder, due process mandates that the prosecution prove the absence beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1977); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See also
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (seemingly inconsistent with Feny, 277
U.S. 88, in its holding that due process requires a rational connection between the established fact A and the presumed fact B).
A state need not provide the right to appeal to convicted criminals; however, once it
has done so, it thrusts upon itself certain burdens under both due process and equal
protection. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (establishing indigent appellant's
right to free transcript or its equivalent); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(establishing indigent's right to appellate counsel for first felony appeal). It need not
provide welfare benefits, but by doing so it may acquire procedural due process obligations. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
A state need not define a jury's role in capital sentencing procedures, but once it
does so, the eighth amendment prohibits it from tolerating prosecutorial arguments
which might lead ajury to conclude that its role is not so important. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). By structuring penal statutes one way, a state may be prohibited by double jeopardy principles from imposing a penalty equivalent to one
permissible under differently structured penal statutes. See Thomas, An Elegant Theory of
DoubleJeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827, 838-39, 857-58.
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limiting instruction procedure is that the instruction will fail, and
the jury will use the statement of the codefendant as evidence
against the defendant.' 19 The codefendant, in effect, will become a
witness against the defendant. Where the codefendant has not testified, the defendant will not have the opportunity to stand face-toface with his or her accuser and to cross-examine him or her while
he or she is under oath and while the jury is able to scrutinize the
demeanor of the accuser.
However, in cases where the Confrontation Clause would permit a trial court to direct the jury to consider hearsay as evidence
against a defendant, the Supreme Court has decided that the lack of
such an opportunity to cross-examine does not necessarily violate
the sixth amendment. 120 Once it appears that, under Dutton and Lee,
an out-of-court accusation bears sufficient indicia of reliability to
permit recognition of an exception to the requirements of oath,
face-to-face meeting, demeanor scrutiny, and cross-examination, the
matter is at an end. There is no way to avoid this result without
rejecting the jurisprudence appearing in decisions from Dutton
through Lee.
A defendant may be in an awkward position where a codefendant's statement is deemed inadmissible hearsay in the defendant's
case, and, nevertheless, the defendant's jury has heard the codefendant's hearsay accusations. At least in cases where the prosecution can survive a defendant's motion for a directed verdict without
having to rely upon the codefendant's statement, a defendant might
prefer to have the trial court admit the codefendant's confession as
evidence against the defendant. Then the defendant could make a
frontal assault upon the codefendant's hearsay accusations.
This, however, is not a sixth amendment problem. As long as
the defendant is allowed normal modes of impeaching hearsay declarants-just as if the hearsay had been admitted against him or
her-it is hard to see how he or she can claim denial of confrontation. The problem is a tactical one, much like that faced by a defendant in Nelson v. O'Neil.12 1 In that situation, the codefendant's
hearsay statement also remains inadmissible as to the defendant
even though the codefendant testifies and is available for confronta119 For a discussion of the claim that limiting instructions will be ineffective in codefendant confession cases, see Haddad, supra note 6, at 40-42, which asserted that empirical data was not available to measure the effectiveness of limiting instructions in any
particular context and that intuitively other limiting instructions are as likely to be disobeyed as is the codefendant instruction condemned in Bruton.
120 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 47-82.
121 402 U.S. 622 (1970). See infra notes 129-132.

1990]

BRUTON AND RELIABLE DECLARATIONS

261

tion. 12 2 In both situations, the defendant must decide whether to
attack the codefendant's hearsay accusations even though the court
will direct the jury not to consider that accusation in determining
the defendant's guilt.
On the other hand, as Justice Brennan suggested by implication
in Nelson v. O'Neil,123 the limiting instruction problem that gave rise
to Bruton is not solved simply because there has been no violation of
the Confrontation Clause. If a particular jurisdiction deems a codefendant's confession inadmissible hearsay as to a defendant, there is
a danger that the jury in a joint trial will misuse the evidence. The
substantial probability of such misuse is an essential premise of the
Bruton decision. 1 24 Where domestic law prohibits the jury from considering a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant,
such misuse is possible in ajoint trial even when the defendant testifies, as in Nelson. Misuse is also possible where the jurisdiction
chooses not to admit a non-testifying codefendant's confession as
evidence against a defendant even where the Confrontation Clause
would permit use of such hearsay.
In jurisdictions which still prohibit use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against a defendant, as did almost every American jurisdiction did before the advent of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the 1970's, 125 the essential problem of codefendant
confession cases is that by utilizing an ineffective limiting instruction
in ajoint trial, courts would subvert a domestic law hearsay prohibition in a limited class of cases, namely, those where the codefendants are jointly tried before ajury and the evidence shows that one
defendant has made a statement implicating the other in a crime.
Jurisdictions which long before Bruton reached the "Bruton result"
126
recognized this problem.
Justice Brennan, the author of Bruton, also recognized this
problem when he later dissented in Nelson v. O'Neil.12 7 In O'Neil the
confessing codefendant took the stand and underwent cross-examination by the defendant. 128 The trial court, under domestic law,
deemed the codefendant's post-arrest statement inadmissible hearsay as to the defendant, and it so informed the jury through a limit122
123
124

Id. at 626. For a discussion of O'Neil, see infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
Id. at 633-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
At least Bruton assumes that the jury will not be able to adhere to the limiting

instruction. See supra notes 33, 70, 116, and 119.
125

See supra note 10.

See Haddad, supra note 6, at 44-45. See also People v. Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d 400, 41315, 530 N.E.2d 423, 429-30 (1988).
127 O'Neil, 402 U.S. at 632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 624.
126
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ing instruction.129 The dissenters, through Justice Brennan, argued
that, as in Bruton, the jury was likely to disregard the limiting instruction.13 0 It was likely to use against the defendant a statement of the
codefendant which domestic law had deemed inadmissible hearsay
against the defendant.13 1 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, framed the issue as one of procedural fairness:
The question, therefore, is whether California, having determined
for whatever reason that the statement involved in this case was inadmissible against respondent, may nevertheless present the statement
to the jury that was to decide respondent's guilt, and instruct that jury
that it should not be considered against respondent.... In the present
case, California itself has made the judgment that, although Runnels
did take the stand, his extrajudicial statements could not be considered by the jury as evidence against respondent ....

[H]aving made

the determination that Runnels' statement could not be considered as
evidence against O'Neil[, California] may not subvert its own judgment in some but not all cases by presenting the inadmissible evidence
to the jury and telling the jury to disregard it. For the inevitable result
of this procedure is that, in fact, different rules of evidence will be
applied to different defendants depending solely upon the fortuity of
whether they are jointly or separately
tried. This is a discrimination
32
that the Constitution forbids.'
The Nelson majority did not reject the dissenters' premise that
the jury was unlikely to adhere to the limiting instruction in cases
where the confessing defendant testified. Rather, the majority said
that every requirement of the Confrontation Clause was satisfied
once the confessing codefendant testified and was subject to full
cross-examination by the defendant in a face-to-face confrontation
13 3
between accuser and accused in the presence of the jury.
If the Nelson majority's interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause was wrong, then confrontation protections would extend
even to some cases where the accused has been allowed to stand
face-to-face with his accuser and to cross-examine him in the jury's
presence. Quite properly there is no support in United States
Supreme Court decisions for this extension of the Confrontation
134
Clause protection.
129 Id.
130 402 U.S. at 633-34 (Brennan, J.,
131 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

dissenting).

133 Id. at 629-30.
134 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (admission of declarant's prior incon-

sistent statement does not violate Confrontation Clause when declarant testified as witness at trial and was subject to full cross-examination). One lower court has suggested
that, except in the case of prior inconsistent statements, a defendant has a sixth amendment right to immediately cross-examine a declarant, at least where the declaration does
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The problem with the Nelson dissent is that Justice Brennan did
not say which constitutional provision prohibits California from subverting its own rules of evidence. Because he relied upon Bruton, a
sixth amendment case, he was presumably referring to the Confrontation Clause. However, one cannot find in that clause such a prohibition. To do so, one would have to reason as follows: because the
Confrontation Clause sometimes helps to promote fairness, the
Confrontation Clause therefore prohibits any procedure which undermines fairness. This is a classical fallacy.' 3 5 It is akin to arguing
that because the exclusionary rule promotes deterrence of police
misconduct, the exclusionary rule therefore prohibits any procedure, such as an enforcement of a standing requirement, that undermines deterrence of police misconduct. 13 6 Similarly, it is like
asserting that because the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination promotes personal privacy, the amendment prohibits
any testimonial compulsion that undermines personal privacy.' 37
The solution to the "Bruton problem" lies in a substitution of a
procedural fairness analysis for a confrontation approach, as one of
the authors has argued at length elsewhere.' 3 8 If it is unfair for a
state to exclude evidence as to a particular defendant, but then to
use a joint trial approach which creates a grave danger that a jury
will improperly use such evidence against that defendant, even
where the Confrontation Clause does not mandate exclusion of such
hearsay as against the defendant, then state courts should require
severance, wholly apart from constitutional principles. If a state has
determined that ajury should not consider one defendant's confesnot bear adequate indicia of reliability. See People v. Bastien, 129 Ill. 2d 64, 541 N.E.2d
670 (1989), which overlooks Nelson. The opinion offers no textual or historical basis in
the Confrontation Clause requiring immediate cross-examination.
135 Expressed as a syllogism, the argument would be:
(1) The Confrontation Clause promotes fairness;
(2) The prohibition against the limiting instruction procedure promotes fairness;
(3) Therefore, conformity to the Confrontation Clause requires a prohibition
against the limiting instruction procedure.
For an example of the fallacy in the Bruton context, see Note, Nelson v. O'Neil, 5
CREIGHTON L. REv. 199 (1971).

136 "Neither those cases [which acknowledge the deterrent aim of the exclusionary
rule] nor any others hold that anything which deters illegal searches is thereby commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. U.S., 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
137 See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956), rejecting the view that
a grant of immunity was inadequate to satisfy privacy concerns. Contra id. at 446-54
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
138 See Haddad, note 6, at 39-49. See also supra note 116. Professor Haddad referred
to a "due process" rather than a "procedural fairness" approach. This label, however,
quite improperly assumed, without discussion, that the Due Process Clause prohibits
states from undermining their own rules of evidence, at least under some circumstances.
See infra note 140.
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sion as evidence against another defendant, then it should prohibit
on domestic law grounds the use of a limiting instruction that is inadequate to prevent a jury from making such use of the confession.
This is exactly what some courts did before Bruton.13 9 We leave for
another day the question of whether courts can properly invoke the
Due Process Clause to prohibit use of an unfair limiting instruction
procedure where a jurisdiction's decision to admit such evidence
140
would not violate the Constitution.
For now, our main conclusion is that the Confrontation Clause
is useless to solve the problem of misuse of evidence under consideration in this paper, just as it is useless to cure the problem of misuse of evidence when the confessing codefendant is subject to crossexamination in the Nelson v. O'Neil situation.
The situation is reminiscent of the invocation in United States v.
Wade 14 1 of the sixth amendment right to counsel to address the
problems of fallible eye-witness testimony and suggestive police
42
identification procedures. The Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois 1
may have been correct when it interpreted the sixth amendment as
attaching only upon the initiation of formal adversary judicial proceedings. 14 3 Once the Kirby Court so narrowly construed the right
established in Wade, because the great majority of lineups and showups occur before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, the
sixth amendment right to counsel was unavailable to remedy what
the Court in Wade had deemed to be problems of extraordinary
magnitude.' 44 The fact that the Court found no sixth amendment
139 See Haddad, supra note 2, at 33 n.164.
140 For such an argument to prevail, a defendant would have to overcome the barrier
of the "greater-lesser" analysis described in supra note 117. Even a court which rejected
such an approach might not accept a due process claim. If a defendant advanced a generalized due process-irrationality claim, the prosecution would respond that government
has a legitimate interest in the consolidation of the trials ofjointly indicted defendants,
so that the need to avoid severance justifies use of the limiting instruction procedure. If
the defendant advanced an "entitlement" theory rooted in the state's adoption of a rule
excluding certain kinds of hearsay, the prosecution might cite a series of recent cases
that severely limit earlier entitlement doctrines. See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections
v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1989) (requiring state-created" 'substantive predicates' to guide official action") (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983));
Shango v.Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982) (procedural protections established by state law, including such things as a state-created right to a hearing, are not
accorded federal due process protections because "[clonstitutionalizing every state procedural right would stand any due process analysis on its head").
141 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
142 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
143 See Israel, Criminal Procedure, Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MicH.

L. REv. 1320, 1363 n.24 (1977).
144 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-39.
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violation in Kirby 14 5 did not mean that the problems were solved. It
meant only that the sixth amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, was inadequate to resolve the problems.146
The sixth amendment similarly is unavailable to address the
limiting instruction problem where state law excludes a statement
that it could have admitted consonant with the Confrontation
Clause. Thus, courts should use a procedural fairness rationale to
reach situations where the limiting instruction procedure is inadequate to assure fairness even though the sixth amendment confron14 7
tation guarantee is satisfied.
If the authors are correct in concluding that confrontation analysis cannot mandate severance to protect a defendant against the
possible use of a codefendant's confession against him where the
Confrontation Clause would allow the court to admit such confession against the defendant, and if courts do not substitute a fairness
basis for the confrontation rationale, a revolution will occur in consideration of Bruton claims, at least in jurisdictions which recognize
no declaration against interest hearsay exception.
We envision a situation where, before granting severance under
Bruton in any codefendant confession case in which domestic law excludes the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, the judge will have to determine whether the Confrontation
Clause hypothetically would have allowed such use. This process
will involve a complicated case-by-case reliability analysis of the type
the Supreme Court has gone great lengths to avoid in decisions like
Bourjaily v. United States.148 Even if prosecutors do not often ultimately succeed in convincing courts that the Confrontation Clause
would have permitted use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, their efforts will consume extensive
145
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Perhaps, if the use of counsel provides the appropriate solution to problems of
misidentification, the Supreme Court should have found in the general language of the
fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses a right to counsel that extended
even to many pre-trial identification procedures not governed by the counsel clause of
the sixth amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), finding, in the fifth
amendment, a right to counsel that sometimes attaches sooner than does the sixth
amendment right to counsel.
147 See Haddad, supra note 6, at 33. It bears repeating that George Henry Bruton did
not make a confrontation claim at any stage of the litigation. The United States Supreme
Court opinion in Bruton thus relied upon a constitutional provision not once cited by the
prevailing party.
148 483 U.S. 171 (1987). Boudaily held that the Confrontation Clause is automatically
satisfied where a statement falls within a "well-rooted" hearsay exception, thus obviating
a need for a reliability analysis of the particular statement. Id. at 184.
146
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time and energy of both the trial and reviewing courts. 49
Under a procedural fairness approach, by contrast, courts will
not be required to make such decisions. Once domestic law mandates exclusion of the codefendant's confession as evidence against
the defendant, it will be irrelevant to the severance issue whether
the Confrontation Clause would have prohibited use of the codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Jurisdictions which have made a policy judgment banning the
use of inculpatory third-party declarations against penal interest
should not permit that judgment to be undermined by the use of the
kind of limiting instruction procedure condemned in Bruton. However, where the Confrontation Clause would permit use of a codefendant's confession as evidence against the defendant, courts
cannot properly interpret the Confrontation Clause as prohibiting
use of the joint trial-limiting instruction procedure. Accordingly,
those jurisdictions should invoke a procedural fairness rationale for
requiring severance absent some other means of satisfying the con150
cerns expressed in Bruton.

149 The authors believe that often prosecutors will convince courts of the reliability of
third-party inculpatory declarations against interest. See supra note 83.
150 We refer to redaction or other means of complying with Bruton. See supra note 87.

